Corporate-Crime Deterrence and Corporate-Control Policies (From White-Collar Crime Reconsidered, P 289-308, 1992, Kip Schlegel and David Weisburd, eds - See NCJ-140367)

• NCJ Number: 140380
• Author(s): S S Simpson
• Date Published: 1992
• Length: 20 pages
• Sale Source: Northeastern University Press
• Publication Type: Survey
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

The applicability of a deterrence model for corporate crime was analyzed by examining the circumstances and choices that guide corporate managers as they view and negotiate ethically questionable situations.

Abstract

Data came from interviews with 59 top and middle managers representing three large United States manufacturing corporations. The author conducted the interviews using a conversation format guided by several specific themes. Results revealed that managers generally do not think in deterrence terms when considering the ethical choices they make on the job. When they do, the relevance of formal legal sanctions is revealed when managers contemplate traditional occupational offenses like embezzlement, bribery, and employee theft and not when they contemplate corporate offenses. Moreover, as these data and critics of the rational-choice model of corporate decisionmaking suggest, many organizational decisions are irrational. For these reasons, means other than legal approaches used in isolation may be a better way to accomplish corporate crime control. Thus, visible and fair corporate compliance systems may effectively supplement a formal sanction model. 42 references