NCJ Number
227035
Journal
British Journal of Criminology Volume: 49 Issue: 1 Dated: January 2009 Pages: 48-67
Date Published
January 2009
Length
20 pages
Annotation
This article examines whether moral panics have occurred in white collar-crimes, and if so, whether any have followed a classic moral panic trajectory, and if they have not, the reason for failure.
Abstract
When formulating the original model of folk devils and moral panics some 30 years ago, Cohen (1972) hardly had white-collar crime in mind. Even though it is hard to generate and to sustain a moral panic about any white-collar crimes and criminals, some populist areas, such as identity fraud and investment fraud are identified as good candidates. However, long time scales in fraud discovery, investigation, and criminal justice actions inhibit the devilling and the moral panicking processes. By contrast with street crimes, key state actors manage the problem of fraud mainly by data-sharing, compensation, and regulation, along with some symbolic degradation ceremonies calming the factors that might stoke counterproductive reactions that might harm the economy. This article elaborates and focuses on the utility of five crucial elements or criteria of moral panic: concern, hostility, consensus, disproportionality, and volatility. The utility of these elements provides an avenue to understanding social reaction to different white-collar crimes and criminals. It is concluded that Cohen’s general construct remains a useful tool in helping understand the similarities and differences between crimes in the suites and the crimes on the streets, so long as three main concepts: panic, folk devil, and moral panic are all deconstructed, understood, and reassembled within the different cultures of control that they dynamically inhabit. Figures and references