Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence - A Critique From the Perspective of Juror Psychology

• NCJ Number: 93958
• Journal: Villanova Law Review Volume: 28 Issue: 3-4 Dated: (1982-83) Pages: 554-571
• Author(s): D J Imwinkelried
• Date Published: 1983
• Length: 17 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Based in part on the Twelfth Hodson Criminal Law Lecture that the author delivered at the Judge Advocate General's School, University of Virginia, on March 18, 1983.

Annotation

This study reviews the causes, criticisms, and merits of the trend toward increased reliance on scientific evidence in criminal trials.

Abstract

The causes of the increased use of scientific evidence include (1) the pace of technological change, which constantly increases the number of scientific instruments and techniques available for use in the courtroom; (2) scientists' increased focus on the forensic application of their research; (3) the lessening of evidentiary barriers to the admission of scientific proof; and (4) attorneys' realization that lay jurors expect scientific proof. Critics of the increased use of scientific evidence argue that there is mounting evidence of misanalysis in forensic science and that triers of fact, especially lay jurors, cannot cope with forensic evidence. The first criticism has substantial merit; there is empirical evidence of a shockingly high level of error in forensic analysis. In the late 1950's, the Toxicology Section of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences uncovered indications of 'a great degree of error' in blood alcohol analyses. In the mid-1970's, Dinovo and Gottschalk reported significant variations among laboratories in drug analysis. The Laboratory Proficiency Research Testing Program, which involved 240 forensic laboratories throughout the United States, found a high percentage of inaccurate or incomplete results in the analysis of blind samples sent for testing. The second criticism of the increased use of scientific evidence -- the inability of jurors to cope with such evidence -- has little empirical support but is a deep-seated belief among the judiciary. Counterarguments to the criticisms argue that scientific evidence is as reliable, if not more reliable, than other types of evidence and should not be submitted to uniquely restrictive standards for admission. Also, empirical studies have given reason to doubt that lay jurors are overawed or incompetent to deal with scientific evidence. Research in this area is in its early stages, and it may be able to distinguish those types of scientific evidence which are within the scope of jurors' capabilities. A total of 120 footnotes are provided.