NCJ Number
174552
Journal
Virginia Law Review Volume: 83 Issue: 2 Dated: March 1997 Pages: 349-395
Date Published
1997
Length
47 pages
Annotation
This article identifies and discusses the dynamics and implications of two phenomena that the standard economic conception of deterrence overlooks: the contribution that "social influence" makes to individuals' decisions to commit crimes and the role that regulation of "social meaning" can play in determining the direction of social influence.
Abstract
"Social influence" refers generically to how individuals' perceptions of each others' values, beliefs, and behavior affect their conduct, including their decisions to engage in crime. The regulation of "social meaning" refers to all the ways in which the law creates and shapes information about the kinds of behavior that members of the public hope for and value, as well as the kinds they expect and fear. The phenomena of social influence and social meaning matter for deterrence. The decisions of individuals to commit crimes are influenced by their perception of others' beliefs and intentions; the law shapes information about what those beliefs and intentions are. It follows that a community that wants to deter crime should concern itself not just with the effect of particular policies on the price of crime (severity of punishment) but with the statements that those policies make and enable others to make about the public's attitudes toward criminal behavior. This strategy, which the author calls the "social influence conception of deterrence," will sometimes generate policy insights that elude the standard economic conception. Given the power of social influence, laws that shape individuals' perceptions of each others' beliefs and intentions, for example, may often be the most cost-effective means of deterring crime. Cracking down on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, open gang activity, and other visible signs of disorder may deter crime by giving community members the impression that the community believes that order, civility, and respect for neighbors are valued behaviors. In addition, the social influence conception of deterrence will sometimes subvert the prescriptions of the standard economic conception. Under the standard view, for example, it may seem efficient to rely more heavily on a severe penalty than on a high probability of conviction; but if individuals infer widespread criminality from a low probability of apprehension, the power of social influence could more than offset any efficiency gains from this tradeoff. Likewise, visible efforts by private citizens to protect themselves from crime may convey that criminality is rampant. It might make sense for the government to assume a greater share of the burden in preventing crime than the standard view suggests is optimal. 160 footnotes