NCJ Number
81494
Journal
Human Rights Volume: 10 Issue: 1 Dated: (Winter 1982) Pages: 14-17,46-47
Date Published
1982
Length
6 pages
Annotation
This article argues that the exclusionary rule should be supplemented rather than abolished and analyzes the reasons for the widespread hostility toward the rule.
Abstract
The exclusionary rule asks the court to turn back the clock and reconstruct events as though the damaging evidence uncovered by the police never existed. From a public relations standpoint, deciding fourth amendment questions after the search or seizure has taken place is the worst time to do so, for now an apparently guilty person is relying on the fourth amendment. But from a practical standpoint, it is the first time such fourth amendment questions can be decided. Critics have called the exclusionary rule illogical, but it is not illogical to conclude that the government is supposed to honor the right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the government violates that right, it should not be able to benefit from it. The exclusionary rule is a seemingly remote and inherently limited control device. The exclusionary rule does not impose any framework of limitations on the police and it does not change the existing framework. The framework had been imposed by the State and Federal guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure long before the exclusionary rule was adopted. Cases discussed in relation to the exclusionary rule include the Minnesota case of O'Connor v. Johnson, Mapp v. Ohio, and the 1914 Weeks case. References are contained within the text.