NCJ Number
87964
Journal
American Journal of Criminal Law Volume: 10 Issue: 1 Dated: (March 1982) Pages: 27-45
Date Published
1982
Length
19 pages
Annotation
This paper examines a juvenile's waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination; minimal constitutional safeguards are compared with expanded protections afforded juveniles under State laws in some jurisdictions.
Abstract
The early cases involving extrajudicial confessions of juveniles, such as Haley v. Ohio (1948), relied exclusively on the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. It was construed to prohibit self-incriminations made against the free will of the defendant. Subsequently, this voluntary test was extended to the States through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In later years, the Court became increasingly dissatisfied with the voluntary test because suspects proved ignorant of their rights; thus, they were easy prey for State officials seeking a conviction. In an effort to place the defendant on equal footing with the police, the Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) mandated advisement of specific rights. In the landmark juvenile case of In re Gault (1967), these adult safeguards were applied to juveniles subjects to commitment and delinquency proceedings. However, after a long struggle which is not yet resolved, the Court appears to have only retained for juveniles the basic constitutional safeguards available for adult confessions. Several empirical studies suggest that juveniles do not possess sufficient verbal development to waive their rights. Because a minority of jurisdictions disagree with the Supreme Court's premise that juveniles need no additional protections, these jurisdictions have enacted statutory protections. Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Florida, Georgia, and Michigan have passed such provisions. The empirical data available thus far support the need for added juvenile safeguards. The article provides 100 footnotes. (Author summary modified)