NCJ Number
182795
Date Published
1998
Length
191 pages
Annotation
This book confronts the assumption widely held in American society that the death penalty is, and can be, morally justified.
Abstract
The author views execution as a social practice, something people do to other people in community. American law has sanctioned the death penalty and continues to widen the opportunities for its application. Because the practice of execution is directed by a system of justice administration, this inquiry confronts that system as well, although it is the moral meaning rather than the details of death penalty litigation that is the focus of the book. The 1972 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia, which imposed a moratorium on executions, is considered, along with other court cases at relevant points of discussion. The ethical critique that is the focus of this book yields a conclusion that challenges the widespread assumption that the death penalty is so clearly justifiable that it can withstand any challenge. The author concludes that reasons advanced in support of capital punishment are inadequate to justify lifting the presumption against it. The death penalty as a practice fails to meet the standards of justice imposed by a theory of just execution; therefore, the death penalty is neither moral nor just. It falls short in the face of an imperfect criminal justice system and in the face of actual injustices committed in an arbitrary system of execution selection. Chapter notes and a subject index