NCJ Number
99100
Journal
Annual Survey of American Law Volume: 1984 Issue: 1 Dated: (1984) Pages: 95-120
Date Published
1984
Length
26 pages
Annotation
Following an examination of how Federal courts have used the technical violation exception and contextual limitations to reduce the scope of the exclusionary rule, this article discusses the ways in which States have reacted to these limitations.
Abstract
Recent U.S. Supreme Court exclusionary jurisprudence has emphasized that enforcement of the rule on the grounds that it will deter violations of personal rights is warranted only if the deterrence effects are not outweighed by their costs to the truth-finding process. In general, Federal courts have held that illegally seized evidence is admissible in grand jury proceedings and in probation or parole revocation proceedings. The view that deterrence is the only justification for invoking the rule also underlies the technical violation exception, an aspect of the good faith exception to the rule which permits the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence when the official reasonably believed that the action was constitutional. Despite this emphasis on deterrence, in standing cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the rule is available only to those whose own privacy rights are violated, however great the damage to the rule's regulatory aims. In responding to limitations on the scope of the exclusionary rule, States have used a variety of approaches that transcend the Supreme Court's deterrence rationale and standing rules. By using regulatory, judicial integrity, and personal rights approaches and case law interpretations of State constitutional guarantees, as well as relaxation of the personal aggrievement requirement and the retention of the automatic standing rule, States have been able to find broader protections for their citizens against illegal searches and seizures. Included are 190 footnotes.