NCJ Number
131710
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 28 Issue: 1 Dated: (1990) Pages: 143-160
Date Published
1990
Length
18 pages
Annotation
Roving surveillance orders are a product of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, but this legal note contends that a search conducted pursuant to a roving surveillance order is unconstitutional.
Abstract
The 1986 Act modifies the traditional fourth amendment requirement that the place to be searched be specifically described in the search warrant. With this modification, the designated person's pertinent conversations may be intercepted regardless of where they occur. The statute not only avoids the particularity requirement but also eliminates the requirement of a specific finding by a magistrate of probable cause to intercept conversations wherever the target person goes. Four reasons are cited for the unconstitutionality of a search pursuant to a roving surveillance order: (1) because the order permits searches of places not specifically authorized by a magistrate's determination of probable cause, investigators exercise broad discretion in determining whether a given place should be searched; (2) the order authorizes searches that are not sanctioned by an impartial judicial finding of probable cause; (3) the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is frustrated by allowing searches not specifically sanctioned by a magistrate; and (4) searches pursuant to roving surveillance orders cannot be justified by countervailing law enforcement needs. It is hoped that the U.S. Supreme Court will continue to prohibit the wholesale removal of constitutional protections in order to accommodate the needs of law enforcement. 69 footnotes