NCJ Number
189536
Journal
Nonproliferation Review Volume: 6 Dated: Fall 1999 Pages: 17-34
Date Published
1999
Length
18 pages
Annotation
This article discusses chemical and biological weapons (CB) and their use both in terrorist organizations and on the battlefield.
Abstract
While the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by terrorists is definitely feasible, terrorist organizations face enormous obstacles on the path to a CB weapon capability. This decreases the likelihood of their proliferation to terrorists. Moreover, if terrorists acquire such a capability it is highly probable that the quality of the agents will be well below that of similar agents in military arsenals. Terrorism with chemical and biological materials deals with the use of any toxic substance or pathogen in pursuit of certain goals. Terrorism with CB weapons refers to the use of warfare agents, that is a toxic chemical designed, developed, and selected by the military to support certain missions laid out in the military doctrine of a state. Terrorist organizations have shown relatively little interest in CB materials. Chemical and biological weapons only make sense in relationship to specified goals. The prime reasons for using CB weapons on the battlefield are not necessarily casualty production. Denying terrain, degrading combat effectiveness by forcing the enemy to don protective clothing, and degrading the operability of facilities and equipment together with imposing the need for elaborate decontamination procedures, causing terror and psychological exhaustion, flushing out enemy troops from strongholds, incapacitation, and crop destruction are all major applications of CB weapons. Contrary to widespread belief, the norms against both state and sub-state acquisition and use of CB weapons have been greatly strengthened. In addition, there is more awareness of the security risks involved in proliferation, which means less likely unwitting partners in the acquisition of CB weapons by terrorists. 1 figure and 44 notes