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Can Confrontation, Negotiation, or Socialization Solve the Superfund Enforcement Dilemma? (From Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates, P 322-338, 1995, Frank Pearce and Laureen Snider, eds. - See NCJ-160666)

NCJ Number
160679
Author(s)
H C Barnett
Date Published
1995
Length
17 pages
Annotation
This analysis of efforts by Federal agencies to make industrial corporations clean up hazardous waste sites uses a structuralist analysis to describe the failures of the original strategy and to analyze the compromise solution now being used.
Abstract
The Environmental Protection Agency and the Congress set up the Superfund in 1980 to clean up hazardous waste sites, force polluters to pay their share, and have the public contribute the remainder. More than 60 percent of the total costs of an estimated $100-300 was thought to be recoverable from the offending corporations. However, active enforcement based on punitive sanctions and litigation has achieved little except to increase the personal fortunes of attorneys and professional lobbyists. After more than a decade of this effort, a compromise solution has been suggested that minimizes confrontation in favor of policies that involve all parties. The compromise also seeks to use flexibility and negotiation instead of the blame and rigidity that have characterized the approach taken to date. Both a pessimistic outcome and an optimistic outcome are possible, but the optimistic one allows more room for agency and struggle and relies more heavily on concepts of enlightened self-interest. Notes

Sale Source
University of Toronto Press
Address

10 St. Mary Street, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario M4Y 2W8 Canada, Canada

Publication Type
Legislation/Policy Analysis
Language
English
Country
Canada