NCJ Number
101110
Journal
Criminal Law Bulletin Volume: 22 Issue: 2 Dated: (March-April 1986) Pages: 131-143
Date Published
1986
Length
13 pages
Annotation
This article examines why prosecutors engage in courtroom misconduct and why the present system offers little incentive for prosecutors to correct such behavior.
Abstract
It accepts the definition of prosecutorial misconduct as any activity by the prosecutor that tends to divert the jury from reaching its verdict by weighing the legally admitted evidence in the manner prescribed by law. Prosecutors are tempted to manipulate the jury beyond the persuasive power of admissible evidence because research indicates that juries can be manipulated by prosecutors' opening and closing statements that go beyond the presented evidence. Research also shows that evidence ruled inadmissible by the trial judge still influences the jury's decision, particularly when little other prosecution evidence is offered. The benefits of prosecutorial misconduct (winning the case) outweight the possible consequences (losing the case), since misconduct in a weak case is a reasonable risk, and misconduct in a strong case is not likely to produce a reversal on appeal due to the harmless error doctrine. Under this doctrine, an appellate court can affirm a conviction despite serious prosecutorial misconduct as long as such misconduct is deemed not to have affected case outcome. The ultimate reason for the system's failure to curb prosecutorial misconduct is prosecutors' immunity from civil liability. 47 footnotes.