NCJ Number
134998
Journal
American Journal of Criminal Law Volume: 18 Issue: 3 Dated: (Summer 1991) Pages: 263-287
Date Published
1991
Length
25 pages
Annotation
This article argues that the imposition of corporate criminal liability does not require reference to persons or features peculiar to individuals.
Abstract
The article first identifies the role of "personhood" in Federal and State corporate culpability requirements. It then considers and rejects the doctrinal approach that denies personhood to corporations under the assumption that persons and corporations differ radically in kind. The article argues that for some purposes, individuals themselves can be treated as corporations. The analysis then justifies the imposition of criminal liability without the use of premises that mention personhood. Overall, the article concludes that although personhood can be ascribed to corporations, such an ascription is unnecessary for the assignment of criminal or moral responsibility; this only requires reference to features of entities, whether individual or corporate. The authors further reason that there are limits to discrepancies in the comparative mix of types of sanction between individuals and corporations. Justifiable discrepancies in the comparative mix in types of sanction are constrained by the nature of punishment. Sentencing commissions are charged with the delineation of determinate sanctions for individuals and corporations. Commissions should be attentive to the precise limits of disparities in types of sanction between the two entities. 84 footnotes