NCJ Number
110704
Journal
Arizona Law Preview Volume: 29 Issue: 2 Dated: (1987) Pages: 247-279
Date Published
1987
Length
33 pages
Annotation
This article examines arguments pertaining to whether a just law should impose criminal liability for an attempted crime which is 'impossible' to commit, and if so, under what circumstances.
Abstract
Arguments against liability for attempted crimes are several: a legal system should not punish people solely for their thoughts; persons taking steps toward the commission of an impossible crime have not criminally acted, but have only conceived a criminal enterprise; therefore, liability for attempts to commit an impossible crime is for thoughts instead of for criminal acts. The proposition that a person attempting an impossible crime has not acted criminally is the most controversial of these arguments. This might be called the 'No Act Thesis.' The debate over the No Act Thesis confuses two issues: (1) When does an effort intended to issue in a completed crime, but which cannot succeed due to circumstances unknown to the actor, endanger the interest protected by law proscribing the completed crime? This is the danger issue; (2) When should criminal liability for an effort to commit a crime, whether or not its success is possible, be imposed. This is the liability issue. The separation of these two issues provides a better understanding of the arguments for and against liability for impossible attempts. It becomes clear under this conceptualization of the issues that a just law of criminal attempts will require that the efforts for which a person is liable for an attempt must endanger an interest protected by the law proscribing the completed crime. 143 footnotes.