Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused

• NCJ Number: 189711
• Author(s): Norman J. Rabkin; Mark Wielgoszynski; Joseph Kirschbaum; Sally Newman
• Date Published: 2000
• Length: 72 pages
• Corporate Author: US Government Accountability Office
• Sale Source: US Government Accountability Office; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Publication Format: Document
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Downloaded July 18, 2001

Annotation

The report describes the Department of Defense's actions to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its organization, activities, and functions and identifies other actions the department can take to improve implementation of the Secretary's 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative.

Abstract

The Department of Defense is taking steps to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration. It is performing training and field exercises and acquiring weapons systems and equipment. More emphasis has been placed on the threat since the Secretary's 1993 counterproliferation initiative was announced. The Military's branches and the unified commands have used the initiative to guide them in their acquisition program, training, and programs. But the Department can do more. It does not have a centralized picture of how it should respond if weapons of mass destruction are used. Also, it has not taken enough action to assure that its weapons and equipment can survive and operate in a biological and chemical environment. The Defense Department's organizational structure may be too diffused to manage and integrate its counterproliferation mission. The Department has not developed plans to direct counterproliferation initiatives. Nor is there a plan to guide the Department as it assesses its progress in meeting goals. The Department of Defense works with the Department of Energy and the intelligence community in counterproliferation activities. However, few actions have been taken to eliminate redundancies among programs. The Secretary of Defense should develop a plan to help guide the implementation of the Department's counterproliferation actions; include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the Department's organization for counterproliferation; take steps to ensure the threat of weapons of mass destruction is being given enough attention in military doctrine; and devise a mechanism to identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies among counterproliferation programs. Appendices