NCJ Number
164370
Journal
World Policy Journal Dated: (Winter 1996/97) Pages: 41-51
Date Published
1997
Length
11 pages
Annotation
Using principles advocated by Karl von Clausewitz in his 19th-century classic in military strategy, "On War," this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the current "war on drugs."
Abstract
The major goal of U.S. drug control policies is to stem drug abuse and addiction, primarily of heroin and cocaine. The U.S. drug war abroad enlists Federal law enforcement agencies and the U.S. military in an effort to curb the supply of drugs that enters the country. Budgets for drug law enforcement at home and abroad have increased from approximately $1 billion in 1981 to some $10 billion today; yet there is no evidence of a decline in the amount of drugs crossing U.S. borders. Cocaine and heroin are still widely available and less expensive than in 1981. More important, problems of abuse and addiction are more serious today than 15 years ago. Using Clausewitz's principles for an effective war, it is clear that the drug-war strategy reflects both a failure to identify a clear political objective and military mission, as well as the use of inappropriate means -- force and coercion -- to reduce supply. Failure to understand the market nature of the drug trade ensures an interminable "limited war," one in which the means will never accomplish the mission of significantly lowering the overseas drug supply. Fighting a war against a drug market will never succeed in limiting supply or raising prices enough to significantly reduce abuse and addiction, regardless of how much is invested in the effort. Yet, in the current political climate, few public officials have had the courage to challenge the myth that the "war on drugs" is the strategy that must continue to be fueled with more and more money. 15 notes