NCJ Number
199591
Journal
Justice Policy: Analyzing Criminal and Juvenile Justice Issues and Policies Volume: 1 Issue: 2 Dated: Spring 2003 Pages: 3-17
Date Published
2003
Length
15 pages
Annotation
This theoretical analysis shows how two U.S. Supreme Court decisions enable law enforcement officers to engage in racially discriminatory policing with little difficulty.
Abstract
Racially discriminatory policing is defined as any police treatment of visible minorities that is less than adequate or fair where a similarly situated white person would receive adequate and fair police treatment, or a situation where a person is singled out for police attention not because of a violation of law but due to race or ethnicity. Through an analysis of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 1996 and 2001, this paper holds that racially discriminatory policing is a white versus people of color problem, specifically interpersonal conflict between white police officers and people of color. The court decisions in Whren vs. United States (1996) and Atwater vs. City of Lago Vista (2001) have consequences that exacerbate the epidemic of racially discriminatory policing. To stop racially discriminatory policing these U.S. Supreme Court decisions must be challenged. The Whren decision allows police actions motivated by racism to pass muster in courts of law. The Atwater decision allows a racist police officer to elevate the effects of racial profiling by allowing him discretion as to whether to issue a citation or to take a person into custody for minor traffic violations and fine-only misdemeanors. These two decisions, when employed contemporaneously by a racist police officer, translate to mean that his or her actions will not be deemed in violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as there was probable cause for the initial stop. It is suggested that where there is evidence of racial motivation on the part of an officer, courts should find for a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of reasonableness.