NCJ Number
206832
Journal
The Prison Journal Volume: 84 Issue: 3 Dated: September 2004 Pages: 361-378
Editor(s)
Rosemary L. Gido
Date Published
September 2004
Length
18 pages
Annotation
This article discusses four significant court cases, spanning the years of 1940 to 2002, in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of civil commitment for sex offenders to mental institutions.
Abstract
Since the 1940's, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the legality of civil commitment of sex offenders four times, and in all four cases, the Court has upheld the States’ use of their police powers to confine some sex offenders in mental institutions. The first such case was Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County in which a man was confined to a mental institution because he was said to have a psychopathic personality and had no initial involvement with the criminal court system. In the three cases which followed (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997; Seling v. Young, 2001; and Kansas v. Crane, 2002) new laws were challenged which were passed by State legislatures focusing on sex offenders who had served their sentences and were about to be released from prisons. State legislators created a new type of mental disorder where sex offenders were diagnosed as being violent predators. In all three cases, the statutes were upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that incarcerated sex offenders nearing release may be civilly committed to a mental institution. This article discusses four problems with the Court’s ruling and the potential implications for both mental health and criminal justice policy. These problems or criticisms discussed in the civil commitment of sex offenders include: (1) Draper’s (1939) views of crime and mental abnormalities; (2) the Court’s slight of the mental health profession; (3) the justification of protecting children; and (4) the violation of the social justice principle. It is concluded that the Court is wrong in how it has handled the distinction between civil confinement and criminal confinement as it relates to sex offenders. In addition, the Court is wrong in saying that the purpose of civil commitment is treatment and that civil confinement cannot be viewed as punishment. Lastly, the civil commitment of sex offenders has significance for criminal justice policy. References