Tripartite Panels - Asset or Hindrance in Dispute Settlement? (From Arbitration Issues for the 1980s, P 273-283, 9182, James L Stern and Barbara D Dennis, ed. - See NCJ-96502)

• NCJ Number: 96515
• Author(s): A M Zack
• Date Published: 1982
• Length: 11 pages
• Sale Source: Bureau of National Affairs
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

Decisions from tripartite arbitration systems are no better than those resulting from the solo arbitrator. Moreover, the tripartite model has more potential for abuse and is a greater offender with regard to delays and costs.

Abstract

Tripartitism's history shows that the procedure was intended to provide the neutral chairman with expert assistance in fulfilling his decisionmaking responsibilities. The system now has expanded into interest disputes, culminating most recently in final offer selection. At the hearing stage, partisan arbitrators often corrupt the standards of due process by interrupting counsel for the other side during cross-examination. Another unjust gambit is the substitution of the partisan arbitrator at the case's conclusion. At the executive session held by the tripartite panel after the hearing, partisan arbitrators often try to influence the neutral chairman. Equally frustrating to the chairman can be the partisan arbitrator's unwillingness to participate in this discussion. Some theoretical arguments in favor of tripartitism say it provides the parties with positive assurance that the neutral fully understands the issues, assures that the language of the opinion does not create more problems than existed before the arbitration, and is useful in clarifying technical issues. In reality, the tripartite panel offers additional opportunities to influence and alter the neutral's decisionmaking process. Partisan arbitrators are often frustratingly unequal in competence and tend to confide in the neutral during the executive session. Another problem is the frequent requirement of a majority award.