NCJ Number
217513
Journal
Global Crime Volume: 7 Issue: 3-4 Dated: August-November 2006 Pages: 544-560
Date Published
November 2006
Length
17 pages
Annotation
This paper examines the networks that facilitate the transport of nuclear materials from the source to their possible purchasers.
Abstract
The smuggling network to move nuclear materials combines intended purchasers with the criminals who have the logistical capabilities to move materials. A well developed criminal network extends from Siberia and the Urals where nuclear facilities exist to Western Europe where post-Soviet criminals meet terrorists in prison. It is concluded that the most serious trafficking is rarely detected because it is run by professionals whose well established smuggling networks, facilitated by corruption, have the capacity to move significant quantities of diverse contraband without apprehension. The existence of crime-terror networks requires much more attention and analysis by the international community. Technological solutions to safeguard against the diversion and transport of nuclear materials provide only part of the answer. Additional attention needs to be paid to the human component of the nuclear smuggling. Criminals and terrorists are part of an integrated network that includes those that secure nuclear material and transport it to terrorist purchasers. The main trajectory of this route is from Russia, through the Caucasus on to Turkey. Georgia, in particular, has been the epicenter of the smuggling with 300 reported incidents in recent years. This paper analyzes the role of prisons in criminal operations, the interaction of criminals and terrorists, and the character of new organized crime groups. 53 footnotes