NCJ Number
207167
Journal
Criminal Justice Ethics Volume: 23 Issue: 1 Dated: Winter/Spring 2004 Pages: 20-32
Date Published
2004
Length
13 pages
Annotation
This essay is part of a larger project in which the author defends a theory of the foundations of self-defense grounded in the defender's intentions rather than the concept of natural rights.
Abstract
The author first outlines the strict limitations on the use of defensive force under his theory. They are as follows: force may be used only against an unlawful aggressor; the use of force must be strictly necessary; the amount of force must be proportional to the force being threatened; and the attack must be imminent. The core of the essay, however, argues against the theory of natural rights as the theoretical foundation for self-defense. It maintains that the theory of natural rights as the basis for self-defense tends to glorify defensive actions to the point that the strict limits for it are breached, thus undermining compassion, reasonableness, and proportionality as important components of self-defense actions. In focusing on the state of mind of the defender, the author's proposed theory of self-defense, based on the traditional Doctrine of Double Effect, avoids the problem of justifying the action according to whether the attacker is innocent or guilty and emphasizes the constraints of proportionality and necessity in measuring the legitimacy of a particular defensive action. 79 notes