Structured Inequality, Conflict, and Control - A Cross-National Test of the Threat Hypothesis

• NCJ Number: 100636
• Journal: Social Forces Volume: 63 Issue: 2 Dated: (December 1984) Pages: 414-432
• Author(s): K R Williams; M Timberlake
• Date Published: 1984
• Length: 19 pages
• Grant Number(s): 5T32 MH 15123-05; 5T32 MH 14587-06
• Sponsoring Agency: National Institute of Mental Health
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This study examines the relationships in a society among income inequality, political conflict, and severity of criminal sanctions imposed by national governments.

Abstract

Conflict theorists have recently argued that a high level of income inequality increases the threat of the lower economic class to the privileged position of economic elites as well as their ability to influence government social control. This study draws from this argument, along with theory and research on political conflict, to develop a simultaneous equation model of sanctioning by national goverments. The model is tested using the most recent cross-national data available. Results indicate no evidence of an independent effect of income inequality on sanctions or vice versa. Governments limiting citizens' access to power, however, tend to impose sanctions more frequently relative to the level of political opposition, compared to ''democratic' governments. A possible interpretation of the findings is that the exclusionary structure of government is a central intervening variable mediating the effect of income inequality on government sanctions. Tabular data and 52 references.