NCJ Number
97083
Journal
Iowa Law Review Volume: 70 Issue: 1 Dated: (October 1984) Pages: 27-51
Date Published
1984
Length
25 pages
Annotation
This paper challenges Allan Vestal's argument that in a civil action subsequent to criminal processing, a guilty plea, at least to a serious crime, should normally be preclusive against the person who entered the plea, unless that person can show that at the time the plea was entered, he/she lacked adequate opportunity or incentive to litigate.
Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Haring v. Prosise is identified as having stopped the pendulum from swinging to preclusion on an issue of the admissibility of evidence in a trial that was waived by a plea of guilty. Cases that have considered this same problem are divided into three categories. In the first, the criminal defendant comes into court as a civil claimant, seeking relief on a theory turning in some way on the nonexistence of an essential element of the case; in the second, the criminal defendant is a defendant in a subsequent civil proceeding, and the party seeking recovery is the government that initiated prior criminal prosecution; and in the third, the criminal defendant is a civil defendant in an action brought by a third party, in which his defense (or the third party's claim) turns in whole or in part on some essential element of the crime. Each category is identified as having a rough validity, but the strongest candidates for preclusion are said to be within the third category. The difference between the acceptance of a guilty plea in a criminal proceeding and in a civil case is distinguished, and difficulties arising with the use of the nolo contendere plea are addressed. A guilty plea, given its consequences and the degree of judicial involvement, is concluded to be more than an ordinary admission; the importance of it being recognized as such is emphasized. Included is a list of 112 references.