NCJ Number
109549
Journal
Texas Tech Law Review Volume: 17 Issue: 5 Dated: (1986) Pages: 1577-1602
Date Published
1986
Length
26 pages
Annotation
This comment analyzes court actions on an amendment to Indianapolis' civil rights code that declared pornography to be a form of sex discrimination against women and explores arguments which should have been considered by the courts.
Abstract
The U.S. district court found the statute in violation of the first amendment largely because it reached beyond the scope of 'categories of speech, such as obscenity or child pornography, which have been excepted from first amendment protections.' On appeal to the seventh circuit, the ordinance again was rejected because 'it seeks to control nonobscene speech.' The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts without oral argument, full briefs, or written opinion. The court opinions on the ordinance failed to respond to the underlying premise of the ordinance, i.e., that it is designed to control conduct rather than speech; and the opinions also failed to address the possibility that speech which is not obscene within the 'Miller' formulation may in some cases be regulated. Other court opinions indicate that the equality of women is a compelling state interest, compelling enough to override what may otherwise be constitutionally mandated rights. Future court decisions on pornography as sex discrimination will probably turn on whether the claim of sex discrimination and its resultant harm is self-evidently inescapable. 146 footnotes.