Security Services, Constitutional Structure, and Varieties of Accountability in Canada and Australia (From Accountability for Criminal Justice: Selected Essays, P 162-184, 1995, Philip C Stenning, ed. -- See NCJ 166936)

• NCJ Number: 166942
• Author(s): L Lustgarten
• Date Published: 1995
• Length: 23 pages
• Sale Source: University of Toronto Press
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: Canada

Annotation

Based on an examination of the security services in Canada and Australia, this essay draws lessons for accountability in these traditionally secretive agencies.

Abstract

The author first advises that in relation to security and intelligence services, the need for a more or less continuous form of accountability is profound. Apart from the armed forces, which in Western democracies have been kept effectively subordinated, security services are potentially the greatest threat to the functioning of democracy. He then discusses executive and legislative accountability for security services in Australia and Canada and outlines eight features necessary for an effective accountability mechanism in the security and intelligence field. These include independence from the executive, proactive capacity, membership representative of the spectrum of political parties but acting in a nonpartisan manner, and access to information about all aspects of the agency's activities. Other recommended features are the ability to maintain secrecy where necessary; institutional expertise, which is tied to adequate support staff who work full-time; and the capacity to campaign, i.e., to use the media to build up support for its position. The author concludes that the establishment of a structure of functional review, comprehensively covering all the activities of all actors on the security and intelligence stage, is the major challenge to accountability in this decade. 8 notes