NCJ Number
100841
Date Published
1985
Length
15 pages
Annotation
This essay discusses aspects of arms negotiations between the superpowers, including group decisionmaking required to arrive at the United States position, communications between Washington and the delegation during talks, and the concepts of ''bargaining chips' and ''worst case.'
Abstract
Comprehensive arms agreements involving the cooperation of a multitude of nations must begin with an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, but agreement between the two superpowers is not sufficient for a comprehensive agreement. Other nations must be convinced it is in their interest to comply with the agreement. Arriving at negotiation positions is a complicated group decisionmaking process in the United States involving various executive officers and agencies. The specific process will vary among administrations. Involving the legislative branch in the preliminary decisionmaking is risky because of the possibility of leaks. Communications between the negotiating delegation and Washington during talks center in the rights and duties of each of the parties. ''Bargaining chips' can be effective in negotiations provided they are not played too early or too flagrantly. Evaluating a potential agreement from a ''worst case' perspective can help to identify risks, but the risks should be weighed against potential benefits as well as the risks of no agreement.