NCJ Number
50999
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 16 Issue: 1 Dated: (SUMMER 1978) Pages: 29-36
Date Published
1978
Length
8 pages
Annotation
U.S. SUPREME COURT RULINGS RELATING TO THE STOP DOCTRINE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURES ARE NOTED, WITH ATTENTION TO THE LIMITS OF INITIAL DETENTION STOPS, LIMITS OF POLICE ACTION AFTER STOPS, AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE.
Abstract
WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITS OF INITIAL DETENTION STOPS, THE COURT IN 1977 DENIED CERTIORARI IN TWO CASES WHICH UPHELD DETENTION STOPS OF AUTOMOBILES (FLOWERS VS. U.S. AND BENSON VS. NEBRASKA), RULED THAT POLICE MAY CONDUCT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE PROVIDED THEY HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE (CARROLL VS. U.S. -1924), HELD THAT THE POTENTIAL MOBILIY OF A STATIONARY AUTOMOBILE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR A WARRANTLESS SEARCH (COOLIDGE VS. NEW HAMPSHIRE -1971), AND AVOIDED THE EXIGENCY REQUIREMENT, PERMITTING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH BASED ON THE RELATIVELY LOW EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN AN AUTOMOBILE (U.S. VS. CHADWICK - 1977). THE COURT WAS PRESENTED WITH THREE CASES WHICH EXAMINED THE ALLOWABLE EXTENT OF POLICE ACTION DURING A DETENTION BASED ON THE STOP DOCTRINE ARTICULATED IN TERRY VS. OHIO (1968). IN PENNSYLVANIA VS. MIIMS (1978), A POLICE OFFICER ORDERED THE PETITIONER FROM HIS CAR DURING A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS HIS USUAL PRACTICE. IN DIAZ VS. NEW YORK (1977), AN OFFICER, AFTER SEEING WHAT HE THOUGHT TO BE A DRUG EXCHANGE, ORDERED THE DEFENDANT TO TURN OFF THE IGNITION AND GET OUT OF A CAR STOPPED AT A RED LIGHT. IN WORTHINGTON VS. THE U.S. (1976), AGENTS WHO HAD BEEN TRACKING A PLANE, STOPPED THE PLANE AND ENTERED IT ACTING ON THE TIP OF AN INFORMANT WHO CLAIMED THE PLANE CONTAINED MARIHUANA. IN MIMMS, THE COURT UPHELD A STATE SUPREME COURT RULING THAT THE POLICE OFFICER'S ACTION IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT OUT OF HIS CAR AFTER A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNREASONABLE AND A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. IN DIAS AND WORTHINGTON, THE COURT DENIED CERTIORARI, INDIRECTLY AFFIRMING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN BOTH CASES. WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, UNDER WONG SUN VS. U.S. (1963), EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION GAINED IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MUST BE SUPPRESSED. THERE ARE THREE EXCEPTIONS TO THE WONG SUN DOCTRINE: (1) IF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS SUFFICIENTLY DISTINCT FROM THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY MEANS OF THE PRIMARY LEGALITY, IT MAY BE PRESENTED; (2) IF THE GOVERNMENT CAN SHOW THAT IT OBTAINED THE EVIDENCE THROUGH INDEPENDENT AND LAWFUL MEANS, IT MAY BE INTRODUCED; AND (3) EVIDENCE MAY BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPEACHING A DEFENDANT WHO TESTIFIES ON HIS OWN BEHALF. THE COURT HAS GRANTED CERTIORARI IN ONE CASE IN THIS AREA (U.S. VS. CECCOLINI - 1978), WHILE DENYING REVIEW IN TWO OTHERS. REFERENCES ARE FOOTNOTED. (KBL)