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Safer Cities and Residential Burglary: A Summary of Evaluation Results

NCJ Number
164150
Journal
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research Volume: 4 Issue: 1 Dated: (1996) Pages: 22-52
Author(s)
P Ekblom
Date Published
1996
Length
31 pages
Annotation
This study examines the cost-effectiveness of Great Britain's Safer Cities program with respect to residential burglary.
Abstract
Phase 1 of the Safer Cities program was begun in 1988 and completed in autumn 1995. Safer Cities was part of the British Government's wider program to address the multiple problems of some of the larger urban areas. The objectives of Safer Cities were to reduce crime, lessen fear of crime, and create safer environments within which economic enterprise and community life could flourish. Safer Cities initiatives were locally based, with a multiagency approach to crime prevention. Up to summer 1992, just under 300 current or completed schemes in the first 16 cities targeted residential burglary. Three-fourths focused on domestic target-hardening. In the evaluation, the amount of action was measured in terms of money spent. Using data from the Safer Cities Management Information System, maps of scheme locations, and population data from the 1991 Census, an action score was calculated for each small area covered in the evaluation. This score represented the average amount of funds for each household over a given year. To measure outcome, two sources of local data were collected: information from sample surveys of adults and police crime figures. The typical Safer Cities burglary prevention schemes apparently reduced the risk of burglary. The mere fact of actions was as significant as the intensity of action. The overall cost per burglary prevented was, under most conditions, significantly less than the direct financial costs of that burglary to the household and the criminal justice system. There was some evidence of geographic displacement and weaker signs of the opposite effect, i.e., diffusion of benefit that caused offenders to avoid wider areas than was necessary given the boundaries of the targeted areas. Targeting local high-crime areas, other things being equal, promises the best return on investment in preventive action. The most effective programs were those that combined target hardening with other measures and where preventive action for burglary was combined with wider preventive action. 2 tables, 5 figures, and 22 references