NCJ Number
203371
Date Published
December 2003
Length
74 pages
Annotation
This document examines improvements made to United States Attorneys’ Offices since September 11, 2001, in order to quickly and appropriately respond to critical incidents.
Abstract
Well-known failures to respond effectively to critical incidents prompted the Department of Justice to develop a Crisis Management Coordination (CMC) Program. This program required the United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO's) to respond quickly and appropriately to critical incidents by formulating critical incident response plans. After indicating that the job of USAO's is to respond to natural disasters and terrorist attacks in a timely manner. The report focused on various USAOs’ critical response plans from December 2002 to October 2003. Focusing on critical incidents such as Ruby Ridge, the Branch-Davidian standoff, the World Trade Center and Murrah Federal Building bombings, and the Freemen Stand-off, the report states that although USAO's are working to address recommendations made by the CMC, there have been frequent errors of judgment made by response team personnel and frequent problems with the preservation and collection of evidence at the sites of these incidents. Interviews with CMC Program coordinators at 26 USAO's across the United States and interviews with the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA), Criminal Division, Counterterrorism Section (CTS), and Federal Bureau of Investigation officials in charge of critical incident responses, indicate that most USAO's have not prepared and exercised comprehensive plans to guide their responses to critical incidents. Furthermore, it was found that most USAO's failed to prepare comprehensive critical response plans and have never conducted critical incident response exercises. The report indicates that neither CTS nor EOUSA officials have provided effective training in critical response techniques, that these organizations have often lost plans submitted by USAO's, and that both CTS and EOUSA have provided minimal guidance to the CMC Program. Noting that CTS did not review timely submitted plans or provide feedback to USAO's and that EOUSA neglected to examine CMC Program implementation during evaluations of USAO operations, the report concludes that the Department of Justice has not effectively implemented the CMC Program to ensure that USAO's are ready to quickly respond to critical incidents. A series of recommendations to enhance performance measures and to assess the readiness of USAO's is followed by a series of appendices presenting response plans, training conference materials, and survey instruments.