Punishment

• NCJ Number: 92417
• Author(s): D Lovell
• Date Published: 1983
• Length: 29 pages
• Corporate Author: Connecticut Dept of Correction
• Sale Source: National Institute of Justice/; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Written version of a lecture delivered at the Center Church, Hartford CT, June 22, 1983

Annotation

Reasons generally given to justify punishing offenders can be classified as general deterrence, moral paternalism, and pure retribution.

Abstract

Viewing imprisonment as having the sole purpose of punishment has several advantages. It is honest in accepting that the primary effect of imprisonment is suffering for the inmates. Further, it recognizes the dignity of the offender as a person accountable for his/her actions, and it provides a clear sense of the limits of corrections by freeing it from the impossible responsibility of solving the social problem of crime. General deterrence has been argued to be one justification for the institutionalization of punishment. It is argued that by threatening to inflict suffering and demonstrating that the threat will be acted upon, rational persons will seek to avoid the behavior that elicits the punishment. This justification, however, presupposes that in committing those offenses for which punishment is specified, persons rationally consider the possible suffering they will bring upon themselves by committing the offense. The impulsivity and irrationality of human behavior would undermine deterrence as the sole justification for punishment. A second justification of punishment is the concept of moral paternalism. This holds that punishment in varying degrees attaches a measure of negative moral value to acts that harm others and threaten rational social order. The moral paternalist approach emphasizes the element of reciprocity among citizens which is missing from the theory of general deterrence. The paying of a debt for engaging in destructive behavior is institutionalized. A third justification for punishment is to effect retribution, an expression of the prevalent inclination to inflict suffering upon those who have made us suffer or who have done something of which we strongly disapprove; however, although retribution is a popular urge, it has the general effect of perpetuating a cycle of hostility and retaliatory suffering. Punishment is inevitably morally problematic, but it is most acceptable under the concept of moral paternalism, as it involves fair dealing, the credible communication of decent values, and reconciliation between offenders and society. Thirteen footnotes are provided.