NCJ Number
61015
Date Published
1978
Length
39 pages
Annotation
POSSIBILITIES FOR INFERRING THE IMPACT OF DETERRENCE POLICIES THROUGH OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR ARE EXPLORED.
Abstract
MOST EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF DETERRENCE HAVE BEEN BASED ON MACRO MODELS OF CRIME COMMISSION USING AGGREGATED CRIME RATE, SOCIOECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS AS THEIR DATA. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS USING MACRO MODELS, HOWEVER, HAS MAJOR LOGICAL PROBLEMS OF AGGREGATION AND MODEL IDENTIFICATION, MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET EMPIRICAL FINDINGS. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AVOIDS BOTH THESE PROBLEMS. IT DOES ENCOUNTER OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, MAINLY DATA AVAILABILITY SINCE INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL HISTORIES ARE AVAILABLE ONLY FOR THOSE ARRESTED. POSSIBLE NEW DATA SOURCES INCLUDE SELF-REPORTS FROM SURVEYS, PLEA AND SENTENCE BARGAINING DECISIONS, AND VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS. A SECOND PROBLEM IS LACK OF STATISFACTORY ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR; EXISTING MODELS ARE TOO IDEALIZED AND ABSTRACT FOR EMPIRICAL APPLICATION. A DYNAMIC RANDOM UTILITY APPROACH WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR MODELING BOTH THE TIME ALLOCATION AND CRIME COMMISSION ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. THIS APPROACH WILL PROBABLY GENERATE USEFUL EVIDENCE ABOUT DETERRENCE, BUT CANNOT PRODUCE A DEFINITIVE STUDY ON BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF DETERRENCE POLICIES. HIGHER STANDARDS OF PROOF ARE NEEDED IN THIS KIND OF MODELING OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR THAN IN TYPICAL ECONOMIC MODELING BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES AND THE POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS. FIGURES, FOOTNOTES, AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY ARE INCLUDED. FOR THE TOTAL VOLUME OF WHICH THIS STUDY IS A PART, SEE NCJ61013. (CFW)