Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion (From U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Implications for Criminal Justice, P 93-110, 1989, Dean J. Champion, ed. -- See NCJ-121135)

• NCJ Number: 121140
• Author(s): E H Steury
• Date Published: 1989
• Length: 18 pages
• Sale Source: Praeger Publishers
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

The new judicial role in plea supervision under the Federal sentencing guidelines encroaches on prosecutors' discretionary powers.

Abstract

The expressed goal of the Federal Sentencing Commission was to curtail judicial sentencing discretion. At the same time, the commission heeded the warning that the restriction of judicial sentencing discretion would allow the prosecutor, through the selection of charges, to determine the resulting sentence. In an effort to control prosecutorial discretion in plea negotiations, the commission strengthened the role of judges in overseeing plea negotiations, requiring them to reject guilty pleas in cases where the charge does not "adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior." The commission has directed that an agent of the judiciary conduct an independent investigation and file a report with the court prior to the acceptance of a plea based on an agreement. The delicate balance of powers between the executive and the judiciary that has served our system well thus far is threatened by these changes. Prosecutorial discretion should be directly restrained through Congressional mandatory guidelines, just as judicial discretion has been controlled. 6 notes.