NCJ Number
194392
Journal
Nonproliferation Review Volume: 7 Issue: 71 Dated: Spring 2000 Pages: 88-96
Date Published
2000
Length
9 pages
Annotation
This article assesses the threat of the spread of the technology and materials of chemical and biological weapons from the former Soviet Union, describes countermeasures taken thus far, and recommends steps that should be taken to counter this threat.
Abstract
Although the Cold War ended a decade ago, the legacy of the Soviet chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs poses serious proliferation threats. All the ingredients for a black market are present: under-employed or unemployed CBW scientists and sensitive weapons and materials stored at remote locations with inadequate physical security. Numerous reports that describe the recruitment of former Soviet CBW specialists by Iran, Syria, and other countries of proliferation concern, along with the purchase or theft of CBW-related materials and equipment by proliferant states and terrorists, indicate that the potential threats have begun to materialize. The Nunn-Lugar program has taken some belated but useful steps to stem the flow of CBW technology and know-how from the former Soviet Union to other nations. Still, much remains to be done. The U.S. Congress should significantly increase its funding for CBW disarmament and nonproliferation efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program. Congressional leaders have tended to define the Russian CW stockpile as an "environmental problem" and the conversion of former CBW production facilities as "foreign aid." These views are short-sighted and have led to the neglect of real threats to U.S. security. Support for a long-term strategy to contain proliferation from the former Soviet CBW complexes requires that Congress restore funding for Russian CW destruction and drop its ban on assistance for the conversion of former CBW production facilities to peaceful commercial activities. 48 notes