NCJ Number
89889
Journal
Soviet Law and Government Volume: 21 Issue: 1 Dated: (1982) Pages: 50-67
Date Published
1982
Length
18 pages
Annotation
The notion of presumption of innocence specified in the 1977 Russian Constitution has implications for the termination of proceedings on grounds that do and do not exonerate the defendant, release on bail, pardon, and the termination of a case because of the accused's death.
Abstract
Article 160 of the Soviet Constitution states that no person 'may be adjudged guilty of a crime and subjected to punishment as a criminal except by the sentence of a court and in conformity with the law.' This statement contains all the necessary components of the notion of presumption of innocence. Grounds that terminate criminal proceedings or lead to acquittal by a court are (1) absence of the commission of a crime, (2) absence of the elements of a crime, and (3) failure to prove that the accused participated in committing a crime. Termination of proceedings or acquittal on any of these three bases for exoneration is the result of application of the presumption of innocence in the process of proof; however, exoneration should be specified on two grounds: it has been established that the accused did not commit the crime, and it is not proved that the accused committed the crime. The latter grounds for terminating proceedings would permit the resumption of proceedings if new evidence appears. Nonexonerating grounds for terminating criminal cases include the following categories: grounds whose application does not involve a final finding that one is guilty of the commission of a crime and grounds involving official findings of guilty for persons who have been relieved of criminal liability and punishment. In the case of bail, it is impermissible to release a person on bail when no criminal case has been initiated, inasmuch as the finding of guilt is not subject to verification even through preliminary investigation. The concept of pardon should only be applied to a person having been found guilty, since presumption of innocence otherwise applies, and the termination of a case because of the death of the accused is permissible only on condition that there are no exonerating grounds for its termination. Nineteen references are provided.