NCJ Number
91105
Journal
Case and Comment Volume: 88 Issue: 5 Dated: (September-October 1983) Pages: 3-4,6,8,10,12,14-15
Date Published
1983
Length
8 pages
Annotation
A trial court must approach any general injunction against postverdict interrogation of jurors by the media with great caution because of the first amendment free press values and should focus on facts regarding possible harassment and privacy interests of individual jurors.
Abstract
Highly publicized trials have transformed jurors into celebrities, forcing judges to reexamine their traditional roles in order to protect the inherently competing interests of the accused, the jurors, and the press. Once a jury has been properly empaneled, the conflict between the juror's right to privacy and the accused's sixth amendment rights to a fair trial diminish appreciably, while the potential for conflict between the first and sixth amendments increases. However, the court must ensure the integrity of its proceedings and shield the rights of the accused from undue outside influence. This rationale for absolute secrecy during jury deliberations applies with equal force to postverdict interrogation of jurors, whose deliberations may be influenced if they know their decisionmaking processes will be subject to extensive public questioning. Furthermore, postverdict interrogation threatens the individual juror's right to privacy, although constitutional protections in this area remain unclear. The courts have imposed few restrictions on the press's access to judicial proceedings, and recent Supreme Court decisions appear to permit postverdict interrogation of jurors. However, the judge's duty to protect the final verdict from attack forms the primary basis for imposing limitations on postverdict interrogation after balancing the competing interests involved. The crucial issue is whether the circumstances in a particular case justify the imposition of a prior restraint. The paper includes 48 footnotes.