NCJ Number
144574
Journal
Yale Law Journal Volume: 101 Issue: 8 Dated: (June 1992) Pages: 1979-2010
Date Published
1992
Length
32 pages
Annotation
This analysis of the Scott and Stuntz proposals for the retention and reform of plea bargaining to make it more efficient argues that structural problems distort the plea bargaining system, such that it should be abolished.
Abstract
Part I explains how structural flaws impair both due- process and crime-control values. The author argues that the subtle effects on the innocent that preoccupy Scott and Stuntz scarcely exist, except on paper, and that curing them would not, in any event, enhance the efficiency or fairness of the bargaining system. Other flaws in the bargaining structure, which Scott and Stuntz do not address, create serious problems of inefficiency and unfairness. Part II explains why the ameliorative reforms suggested by Scott and Stuntz are likely to prove ineffective. Part III focuses on the most interesting and consequential issue, the claim that a prohibition on plea bargaining would create even more serious problems than does bargaining, especially for the innocent. The author shows that economic analysis, properly understood, supports the opposite result. He therefore concludes that plea bargaining should be abolished. For the Scott and Stuntz essay, see NCJ-144572. 102 footnotes