U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

NCJRS Virtual Library

The Virtual Library houses over 235,000 criminal justice resources, including all known OJP works.
Click here to search the NCJRS Virtual Library

Pathogen Proliferation: Threats from the Former Soviet Bioweapons Complex

NCJ Number
189761
Journal
Politics and the Life Sciences Volume: 19 Issue: 1 Dated: March 2000 Pages: 3-16
Author(s)
Kathleen M. Vogel
Date Published
March 2000
Length
14 pages
Annotation
This article discusses the proliferation threats of pathogen collections from the former Soviet biological weapons (BW) program.
Abstract
Two main Biopreparat research centers in Russia are the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology, otherwise known as “Vector,” in Koltsovo, and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology, in Obolensk. The main pathogen repository at Vector houses over 10,000 viral specimens, to include 109 different samples of the smallpox virus. The concern of BW proliferation has intensified since the restructuring of the BW complex in the early 1990's. The threshold for proliferation is lowered when corruption, financial instability, poor security, and weak regulatory controls exist. To complicate matters, physical security measures at civilian bio-facilities are in poor condition. Adding to these problems, bioweapons facilities are not prepared to deal with the larger and more difficult threat of insider diversion. Collections of biological agents, sometimes called “museums,” are typically stored in a freeze-dried or frozen form within small ampules. It is extremely difficult to track the seed cultures once they leave the “museum” and go into the working stock of the research laboratory. Furthermore, accountancy of biological materials is questionable. The Ivanovsky Institute of Virology in Moscow has a collection that includes 2,700 strains of 600 species of pathogenic viruses from 18 genera, including hantavirus, yellow fever virus, dengue hemorrhagic fever virus, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus. One aspect that should be closely monitored in the future is the financial condition of the Vector and Obolensk facilities. Furthermore, continued support should be directed at engaging additional BW research and production facilities to identify other significant pathogen collections. Addressing the complete proliferation threat is likely to be a longer-term problem given the current economic hardships facing Russia and the former Soviet republics. 1 table, 61 notes and 80 references.