NCJ Number
88074
Journal
Philosophy and Public Affairs Volume: 9 Issue: 1 Dated: (1979) Pages: 43-58
Date Published
1979
Length
17 pages
Annotation
This article discusses the philosophical justifications for punishment of the offender; the retributivist point of view and the utilitarian argument are analyzed, and alternatives to punishment are suggested.
Abstract
The paradox of punishment results from the intuitive plausibility of two theses, one associated with a retributivist point of view and another associated with a utilitarian justification of the institution of punishment. The penal institution is both required and unjustified. The retributivist theory is basically concerned with the amount of punishment which is justifiable in a particular case. It is argued that while violating the rights of others involves forfeiting rights oneself, it is clear that violating specific rights of others should not entail losing all of one's own rights. It would be difficult for a wrongdoer to complain of injustice when the system of punishment treats him in a way equivalent to the way in which he treated his victim. To bring out the paradox in the justification of punishment, the premise regarding limits of punishment must be combined with a plausible premise from the utilitarian theory. It states that a political institution involving the administration of punishment can be justified only in terms of the goal of reducing crime and the harms caused by crime to a tolerable level. The problem is that while a mixed theory can avoid punishment of the innocent, it is doubtful that it can avoid excessive punishment of the guilty if it is to have sufficient deterrent effect. The most promising alternative to unjustified levels of punishment would be to attack the social and economic causes of crime by reducing the great inequalities in our society. Fourteen footnotes are provided.