NCJ Number
125924
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 81 Issue: 2 Dated: (Summer 1990) Pages: 191-234
Date Published
1990
Length
44 pages
Annotation
In order to eliminate the loophole which allows one to escape conviction by the "deliberate ignorance" doctrine, the Federal courts have expanded the definition of knowledge of a fact to include awareness of a "high probability" of its existence.
Abstract
The so-called "ostrich instruction" informs a jury that actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge are the same. The question this approach raises is whether a conviction based on the "ostrich instruction" is compatible with the constitutional requirement that the prosecution prove each element of the crime, including knowledge, beyond a reasonable doubt. While acknowledging the legal loophole, the article concludes that the expanded definition of knowledge of the Model Penal Code is an unacceptable solution. Rather than knowledge, it is determined that deliberate ignorance constitutes recklessness. The history of the deliberate ignorance doctrine is explored, as is its application in American law. The philosophical and legal definitions of knowledge are discussed. The author concludes that a statutory revision which adds recklessness or specific deliberate-ignorance provisions as an alternative basis for conviction would both limit the loophole and resolve the constitutional issues arising from current Federal court practices. 265 references.