NCJ Number
185282
Journal
Boston College Law Review Volume: 41 Issue: 3 Dated: May 2000 Pages: 517-547
Date Published
May 2000
Length
31 pages
Annotation
This article examines why the increase in the practice of allowing witnesses to offer opinions on sentencing in capital trials is likely to continue and presents several reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court should impose an unequivocal ban on sentence-opinion testimony in capital trials.
Abstract
The author first surveys the U.S. Supreme Court's case law regarding the permissibility of sentence-opinion testimony in capital trials. Such case law ostensibly prohibits the admission of such testimony; however, courts across the country now either express uncertainty over the continued existence of the prohibition or uphold admission of sentence-opinion testimony on a variety of rationales. The admission of such testimony is likely to accelerate in capital trials, given the appeal of providing victims a "voice" in determining the fate of their assailants. The first and most fundamental reason in support of the prohibition of sentence-opinion testimony is its distinct irrelevance to capital-punishment decision making. A witness' opinion, even when the witness is a loved one of the murder victim, that a defendant deserves death does not contribute significantly to determining whether or not a convicted offender is worthy of death. A related but distinct reason to bar sentence-opinion testimony is its arbitrary quality, and a third reason for prohibiting it is its usurpation of the sentencing authority's constitutional duty to weigh only relevant factors in sentencing. 147 footnotes