Negotiation in the Rulemaking Process (The 301(h) Case) (From Resolving Environmental Regulatory Disputes, P 222-256, 1983, Lawrence Susskind et al, eds. - See NCJ-101992)

• NCJ Number: 101997
• Author(s): H Burgess; D Hoffman; M Lucci
• Date Published: 1983
• Length: 35 pages
• Sale Source: Schenkman Publishing Co
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

The dispute over the 301(h) waiver provision of the 1977 Clear Water Act demonstrates the weaknesses of an adversarial approach to rulemaking; negotiated rulemaking would be more productive. paralyze the administrative process. EPA also argued that granting variances would undermine the principle of technology-based standards that regulated polluters by type of discharge, regardless of the costs to the discharger or the severity of the impact on the receiving waters. The EPA's adversarial tactics antagonized a number of municipalities and aroused congressional opposition. Negotiated rulemaking, in contrast to EPA's adversarial strategy would offer incentives for all interested parties, with a primary incentive being the relaxation of judicial attitudes; for example, in such cases, courts could accept less detailed agency explanations for decisions. Negotiated rulemaking could streamline the rulemaking process, achieve more effective and innovative solutions, minimize judicial challenges, and ensure greater environmental protection. 106 footnotes.