NCJ Number
161207
Date Published
1994
Length
13 pages
Annotation
This essay assesses the appropriateness of dominant models of plea bargaining by introducing certain organizational assumptions into model equations in an attempt to reconcile the individual-level behavior of participants in the criminal process with the collective, administrative demands arising from the peculiar organization of the U.S. criminal justice system.
Abstract
The intent is to temper economic and decision theory models with an organizational model that can incorporate a broader range of available empirical analysis into the practice of plea bargaining. The direction of the analysis is toward greater "descriptive specificity" about plea bargaining. Analysis findings indicate only partial support for substantive assertions of economic and decision theory models of choice behavior in negotiating and disposing of criminal cases in two urban felony jurisdictions. A more complete explanation of differences in disposition patterns between jurisdictions requires recognition of contextual factors surrounding the choice behavior of prosecution and defense. With a focus on structural characteristics of the criminal process to develop a complementary organizational model that explains plea bargaining, the author refines the concept of "uncertainty" and introduces other concepts such as "technology" and "organizational learning." In addition, he stresses the significance of key organizational attributes that may affect case disposition patterns across jurisdictions. 41 references, 8 footnotes, and 1 table