NCJ Number
75788
Date Published
1981
Length
12 pages
Annotation
This article examines the morality of prescriptions of punishment by legislatures as well as sentences passed by judges, and presents illustrative examples from the Norwegian experience.
Abstract
Decisions by both the judiciary passing sentence and by legislatures making laws may be considered morally defensible from a deterrence standpoint if the decisions are made on the basis of general deterrence (deterring anyone who would be in a position to commit the crime). The decision, however, must be in proportion to the gravity of the offense. Even if deterrent effects can be achieved only with severe punishment, implementing these punishments cannot be justified. Also, the general deterrent effects of a particular punishment decision in a particular case cannot be considered in assigning the punishment. For example, the fact that a case has received great publicity does not justify an especially severe punishment, even though the deterrent effect resulting from publicizing the decision would be considerable. Critics often argue that no scientific proof exists concerning the effectiveness of criminal punishment; however, the necessary balance between societal defense and offender rights cannot be quantified with a simple formula. The issue must be settled based on individual attitudes. As long as society feels obliged to use punishment for general preventive reasons, researchers must attempt to evaluate assumptions about general prevention. Reference notes are included.