NCJ Number
86280
Journal
Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal Volume: 13 Issue: 3 Dated: (Spring 1982) Pages: 405-462
Date Published
1982
Length
58 pages
Annotation
The principles espoused in the Miranda v. Arizona case of 1966 are examined, with emphasis on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court during the Burger era.
Abstract
In the Miranda decision, the Court held that the prosecution may not introduce any inculpatory or exculpatory statement made by a defendant undergoing custodial interrogation unless the State has first shown the use of safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. After Miranda, the Warren Court issued four opinions which further delineated the scope of the decision. In contrast, the Burger Court, from 1971 until recently, appeared to deal with the perceived imbalance in favor of criminal defendants over the police by narrowing the scope of the original decision, by refusing to apply Miranda to situations clearly within the scope of the Miranda rule, and by refusing to extend the Miranda protections to suspects finding themselves in situations implicitly addressed by the Miranda decision. Thus, the Burger Court has consistently undermined the rationales, assumptions, and values underlying the Miranda decision. However, three recent decisions indicate a changed attitude toward Miranda. In both Edwards v. Arizona and Estelle v. Smith, the Court appeared to go out of its way to decide cases on a Miranda theory and also, for the first time, to reverse convictions because of Miranda violations. Thus, the Court appears to have accepted the Miranda principles that abuse of authority thrives on discretion and that the privilege against self-incrimination can be protected during interrogations only where police and judges operate within clearly specified guidelines. A total of 326 case notes are provided.