METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM EVALUATOR - THE MINNESOTA CRIME WATCH EXPERIENCE

• NCJ Number: 43321
• Author(s): J RICHARDSON; P HARTJENS
• Date Published: 1977
• Length: 14 pages
• Grant Number(s): 0319007375; 0321007376
• Sponsoring Agency: Minnesota Governor's Cmssn on Crime Prevention and Control
• Corporate Author: Minnesota Governor's Cmssn on Crime Prevention and Control
• Publication Format: Document
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION (WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY 22-24, 1977); PANEL 20, EVALUATION DESIGNS FOR COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS

Annotation

MAJOR METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS THAT FACED EVALUATORS OF THE MINNESOTA CRIME WATCH PROGRAM ARE REVIEWED; ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF STRATEGIES CHOSEN TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS ARE DISCUSSED.

Abstract

THE CRIME WATCH PROGRAM ITSELF HAD FIVE COMPONENTS: (1) A MASSIVE MEDIA CAMPAIGN TO EDUCATE CITIZENS ABOUT THE CRIME PROBLEM AND THE BENEFITS OF CRIME PREVENTION; (2) A COORDINATION PROGRAM TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES; (3) SPECIAL CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS; (4) A REORIENTATION OF LOCAL AGENCIES TOWARD CRIME PREVENTION; AND (5) PREMISE SECURITY SURVEYS COMBINED WITH OPERATION IDENTIFICATION. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM OF THE ENTIRE EVALUATION WAS LACK OF BASELINE DATA; THE CHARGE WAS MADE THAT THE COMMUNITIES WHICH SHOWED THE GREATEST IMPROVEMENT WERE COMMUNITIES IN WHICH POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLICE AND CRIME PREVENTION EXISTED IN THE FIRST PLACE. ALSO, EVALUATION BEGAN IN THE SECOND YEAR BEFORE THE PROGRAM HAD TIME TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT. THIS PARTICULARLY HAMPERED EVALUATION OF CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING AND REORIENTATION OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS. COST DATA FOR TRAINING WERE READILY AVAILABLE, BUT RAW COSTS OF THE PROPERTY SECURITY SURVEYS WERE INCOMPLETE AND OFTEN BURIED IN OTHER DATA. AS A RESULT, SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES WERE CHOSEN FOR INTENSIVE DATA COLLECTION. THESE SHOWED SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN PROPERTY SECURITY MEASURES, BUT CAUTION MUST BE USED BECAUSE THE SAMPLE IS SO SMALL. STATEWIDE DATA ON OPERATION IDENTIFICATION WAS COLLECTED BY TARGETS RATHER THAN PERSONS. THIS MAKES INFORMATION DIFFICULT TO COMPARE TO OTHER SURVEYS. HOWEVER, NONPARTICIPATING RESIDENTIAL TARGETS WERE BURGLARIZED APPROXIMATELY 3.8 TIMES MORE OFTEN THAN MEMBER TARGETS, AND NONMEMBER COMMERCIAL TARGETS WERE BURGLARIZED 1.7 TIMES MORE OFTEN THAN MEMBER COUNTERPARTS. THIS DATA, PLUS COMPARATIVE FIGURES WHICH SHOW THE MINNESOTA PROGRAM ENROLLED FIVE TIMES MORE RESIDENCES AND COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS THAN 10 SIMILAR PROGRAMS, LED EVALUATORS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PROGRAM WAS WORTH CONTINUING. FUTURE EVALUATORS MUST DETERMINE IF THERE HAS BEEN CRIME DISPLACEMENT, THE EFFECTS OF WHETHER OR NOT PARTICIPANTS IN OPERATION IDENTIFICATION CONTINUE TO MARK ALL SUBSEQUENT PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS, AND ENROLLMENT SATURATION EFFECTS.