NCJ Number
191802
Date Published
1998
Length
43 pages
Annotation
This information paper discussed the consequences of incidental or intentional contamination of potable water supplies by biological warfare (BW) agents. It is intended for use by combat/materiel developers as well as preventive medicine and water production personnel.
Abstract
Most biological warfare (BW) agents are intended for aerosol application, and the threat is primarily to the lungs, not the digestive system. These weapons have been weaponized for an aerosol assault, but not for contaminating water sources. Some agents, namely Shigella spp. and Vibrio cholerae, are water threats. Most biotoxins would probably be effective threats to drinking water under suitable conditions. For others, however, either there is no known infectious path through ingestion, or the agent cannot survive in water. For this paper, the known potential threat to potable water supplies was emphasized. Symptoms suggesting immediate loss of mission ability were also emphasized, rather than the long-term effects of biological agents. The findings of this paper were divided into three parts: (1) BW agents as Waterborne Threats--in general, the bacterial agents, though intended primarily for aerosol application, have strong potential as waterborne threats; (2) Incapacitating Effects--the percentage of troops disabled and the intensity of symptoms were largely unpredictable, but most infectious bacterial agents cause extreme gastrointestinal (GI) distress, with severe stomach pain, diarrhea, and vomiting; (3) Efficacy of Water Treatment--there is little questions that a properly functioning reverse osmosis (RO) system would reduce any BW agent to an inconsequential level in the water product, although low molecular weight agents, such as the mycotoxin T-2, may in time penetrate an intact RO membrane. In general, failure of the reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU) to consistently provide BW agent-free water would be an indication of failed membranes or leaking seals. The paper offered the following conclusions and recommendations: (a) properly maintained, field Army water purification can counter the threat of most BW agents; (b) the chlorine tolerance of most BW agents under conditions of field water disinfection is unknown and should be determined; (c) the utility of Cooper et al. for estimating the likelihood of troops becoming ill from waterborne pathogens should be investigated for all BW agents; and d) field personnel responsible for operation and maintenance of water purification equipment should exercise extreme caution when replacing filters and other components possibly contaminated by live agents. Appendices