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Market for Offences and the Public Enforcement of Laws - An Equilibrium Analysis

NCJ Number
88149
Journal
British Journal of Social Psychology Volume: 21 Issue: 2 Dated: (1982) Pages: 107-120
Author(s)
I Ehrlich
Date Published
1982
Length
14 pages
Annotation
The frequency of offenses of specific types is determined, not by the capricious outcome of biological or social idiosyncracies but as the result of the equilibrating interplay of systematic 'supply and demand' forces.
Abstract
The role of public intervention via police, courts, correctional institutions, and economic policy in general can be viewed in terms of its impact on the equilibrium level of activity in illegitimate markets rather than in terms of its effect on either the supply or the demand sides of these markets separately. The policy implication of this conclusion is that the efficacy of public intervention in the 'business of crime' must be assessed through the relevant comparative statics or dynamics of market equilibrium rather than by reference to partial settings; e.g., it is important to know not just whether a rehabilitative project can enhance the likelihood that a group of known offenders will be successfully involved in legitimate pursuits, but whether the rehabilitative project, even if successful, will lead to a corresponding reduction in the overall volume of crime. Recognition of the role of the 'market for offenses' leads to modifications in previous economic analyses of illegitimate activities concerning not only the efficacy of rehabilitation and other means of direct control of individual offenders, but of means of general deterrence as well. Generally, the relative efficacy of all means of public enforcement of laws is a function of both supply and demand elasticities rather than a function of supply elasticities alone; e.g., any crackdown on enterprises involved in so-called 'victimless' crimes would not markedly affect the volume of transactions because of the demand for the product or service. Monetary fines or taxes would produce both the maximum amount of crime prevention via deterrence while providing direct compensations to society or those who might be victimized by the activities. A prerequisite for any method of individual control to be efficacious in reducing crime at both the individual and the aggregate levels is that there be a significant probability of individual recidivism should rehabilitation not be effective. Mathematical equations and 11 references are provided. (Author abstract modified)