NCJ Number
79404
Date Published
1980
Length
100 pages
Annotation
A surrogate data base consisting of certain nonnuclear crimes was used to examine potential threats to nuclear facilities and programs in the United States.
Abstract
The data base was used to provide an analogy to the types of threats facing nuclear facilities because of the low level of criminal activity against nuclear targets. The data base consisted of 121 sophisticated and high-value burglaries, robberies, and other conventional crimes that are in certain respects analogous to nuclear crimes which have not as yet been committed. Since much of the information came from newspaper and journal articles, it was subject to their errors and limitations. The crimes were analyzed in terms of insider involvement, number of perpetrators, value of loot, type of crime, use of violence, coercion of employees, and the use of deception. The likelihood of insider involvement was found to increase as the value of the loot increased. Crimes involving insiders also had an unusually high rate of apprehension. A large number of crimes occurred while loot was in transit. Crimes using deception or coercion were very successful. The insiders' authority or access determined whether they would use deception. Crimes of coercion usually had employees with authority and access as their victims. Findings indicated that insiders can pose a great threat to nuclear security for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways. Seven specific crimes that were particularly analogous to potential nuclear-related crimes were discussed in detail. Tables and synopses of the individual crimes are provided. (Author summary modified)