NCJ Number
191567
Date Published
1999
Length
16 pages
Annotation
This chapter looks at the vulnerability of local populations to the effects of a biological attack.
Abstract
While most terrorist attacks have been in cities, motivations are changing. For example, the salmonella attack in Oregon in 1984 occurred in small cities and was the result of a desire to influence the outcome of a local election. Attacks against crops or livestock will occur in rural areas. The competency of an attacker is one factor in determining likely targets. Predicting where an attack will occur is increasingly difficult. Intelligence is a crucial factor in the prevention of biological attacks. Biological agents are difficult to find because detection mechanisms are not available. Most law enforcement agencies are unfamiliar with biological weapons signatures. Local authorities believe that the flow of information through intergovernmental agencies to be poor. Intelligence data needs to be accurate so that threats can be reduced. Counterintelligence needs to be retooled to focus on terrorism in the United States, rather than overseas. A town has more than likely not conducted planning for biological incidents. Some exercises have shown that local responders are knowledgeable about responses to hazardous materials, but they know little about responding to nuclear, chemical or biological incidents. Detection is a complex process and hampered by the inability of the medical profession to know whether an outbreak is an attack or a natural occurrence. Quick detection and effective control are the main features of a well-executed response, as a poorly controlled response can lead to widespread panic. To smooth the transfer of control of operations from local authorities to a Federal agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has produced guidelines to follow. Agents collected samples following an explosion of a pipe bomb during the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta. The Centers for Disease Control determined the bomb did not contain biological or chemical agents. But if it had a response team was prepared to wear protective equipment and perform further tests. But terrorists would likely select a target with fewer Federal forces. If a response were focused upon triage and containment, the Federal Emergency Management Agency would take charge. Because biological attacks can occur on trains, it may be difficult to divide responsibilities of a response to cities and towns. A large town may have responders with experience in biological incidents, but smaller towns will not. States need more technical assistance, personnel, supplies, and detection equipment to prepare for terrorist attacks. The National Guard needs more training to assist with a terrorist response. Potential targets include private and government buildings, open areas of assembly, transportation systems, and the food industry. Current funding is inadequate to improve the problems mentioned in this chapter. Although the Federal Government is taking measures to assess the situation and train workers, local funding is meager and adequate resources will not be available for the foreseeable future. Footnotes