Legal Standard of Volitional Impairment: An Analysis of Substantive Due Process and the United States Supreme Court's Decision in Kansas v. Hendricks

• NCJ Number: 192895
• Journal: Journal of Criminal Justice Volume: 30 Issue: 1 Dated: January/February 2002 Pages: 1-10
• Author(s): Patricia E. Erickson
• Date Published: 2002
• Length: 10 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United Kingdom

Annotation

This article considers the implications of the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Kansas v. Hendricks (521 U.S. 346, 1997).

Abstract

In Kansas v. Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether a Kansas statute that established procedures for the involuntary civil commitment of sex offenders following criminal incarceration violates the U.S. Constitution. In State court, Hendricks argued that the Sexually Violent Predator Act violates substantive due process and the prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. The Kansas Supreme Court accepted Hendricks' substantive due process claim and invalidated the Act. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas statute, holding that the act satisfies substantive due process requirements and does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition or its ban on ex post facto law-making. The substantive due process opinion of the Supreme Court in this case has created confusion about the relationship between criminal law and standards for involuntary civil commitment. The Court's recognition of "volitional impairment" as a "mental state" that meets the constitutional standard for involuntary commitment has created normative inconsistency regarding what constitutes "mental states" sufficient for involuntary civil commitment and how such standards should relate to standards for criminal responsibility. The Supreme Court has endorsed a socially constructed reality that permits a person to be judged blameworthy for a criminal offense while permitting that same individual to be judged "dangerous beyond their control," warranting involuntary civil commitment. The real issue to consider is whether involuntary civil commitment is a normatively appropriate means to deal with sexual violence, given the liberty interests protected by the Constitution. 31 references